Introduction
In South Africa the use of force in effecting arrest is statutorily governed by section amendment police officials would have to wait until they were shot at before they were allowed to use their fire-arms in effecting arrest.
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The 1998 amendment to section 49 eventually came into operation on 18 July 2003, 22 a year after the Walters case was decided, two years after the Govender decision, and almost five years after the 1998 amendment had been approved by Parliament. 23 In the seven years since the 1998 amendment came into operation no case has been reported challenging the constitutionality of the 1998 amendment.
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Section 49 currently states (with the 1998 amendment incorporated):
Use of force in effecting arrest
49(1) For the purposes of this section-(a) "arrestor" means any person authorised under this Act to arrest or to assist in arresting a suspect; and (b)
"suspect" means any person in respect of whom an arrestor has or had a reasonable suspicion that such person is committing or has committed an offence.
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The Minister of Safety and Security at the time. .pdf. This differs from the situation in the United States of America where it was predicted that reforms of the law restricting the use of force when effecting arrest could be associated with overall declines in the number of shootings, including fatal shootings, by the police. The ICD is the civilian oversight body which investigates complaints against the police as well as deaths caused by the police and deaths in custody. See in this regard Bruce 2005 South African Review of Sociology 141-159. Bruce indicates (at 156) that the year in which the number of deaths resulting from police shootings were the highest according to ICD statistics was also the year in which South Africa experienced its highest murder rates and the highest number of police killings, thereby implying that a likely reason for the high number of deaths as a result of police action is the high level of violent crime in South Africa and is not an outcome of the implementation of the law providing for the use of deadly force.
(2)
If any arrestor attempts to arrest a suspect and the suspect resists the attempt, or flees, or resists the attempt and flees, when it is clear that an attempt to arrest him or her is being made, and the suspect cannot be arrested without the use of force, the arrestor may, in order to effect the arrest, use such force as may be reasonably necessary and proportional in the circumstances to overcome the resistance or to prevent the suspect from fleeing: Provided that the arrestor is justified in terms of this Section in using deadly force that is intended or is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm to a suspect, only if he or she believes on reasonable grounds-(a) that the force is immediately necessary for the purposes of protecting the arrestor, any person lawfully assisting the arrestor or any other person from imminent or future death or grievous bodily harm; (b) that there is a substantial risk that the suspect will cause imminent or future death or grievous bodily harm if the arrest is delayed; or (c) that the offence for which the arrest is sought is in progress and is of a forcible and serious nature and involves the use of life threatening violence or a strong likelihood that it will cause grievous bodily harm.
It is noteworthy that the wording of the 1998 amendment includes reference to the "future danger principle", a phrase to be found in section 25 of the Canadian Criminal
Code.
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Section 25 of the Canadian Criminal Code in subsections (4) and (5) provides for the use of force in effecting arrest. Subsection (4) provides that a peace officer, and every person lawfully assisting the peace officer, is justified in using force that is intended or is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm to a person to be arrested, if:
(a) the peace officer is proceeding lawfully to arrest, with or without warrant, the person to be arrested; (b) the offence for which the person is to be arrested is one for which that person may be arrested without warrant;
(c) the person to be arrested takes flight to avoid arrest; (d) the peace officer or other person using the force believes on reasonable grounds that the force is necessary for the purpose of protecting the peace 25 Criminal Code of Canada (R.S. C., 1985, c. C-46) . Despite this informative reference to Canadian law, this paper discusses only the developments in South African law with regard to the use of force when effecting arrest over the last years. It does not venture into any comparative analysis since a future publication will follow this methodology.
officer, the person lawfully assisting the peace officer or any other person from imminent or future death or grievous bodily harm; and (e) the flight cannot be prevented by reasonable means in a less violent manner.
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Bruce 27 is of the opinion that the "future danger" provision could have implications for persons, particularly members of police services, who may be faced with a need to perform their legal responsibilities under an ill-defined legal framework which requires them to make a judgment as to whether or not the fleeing person is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm in the future, without providing any guidance as to how such a future danger is to be evaluated, thus exposing themselves to an enhanced risk of criminal prosecution. Bruce 28 also argues that the "future danger"
provision is complex to enforce by the bodies (in South Africa this is the ICD) responsible for ensuring accountability in relation to shootings under section 49, as it compels them to evaluate the shooting in terms of a speculative abstraction. In countries like Canada, where the future danger principle is part of the law, there is less use of force by the police (and lower violent crime rates). These countries are also better able to maintain administrative mechanisms which can impose accountability in relation to such a standard.
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As explained above, the 1998 amendment was opposed by the then Minister of Safety and Security, and almost five years after it came into operation it was still widely criticised, by others as well. It has been criticised as being complex and confusing and lacking in legal clarity. Some are of the view that the new provision hampers the police in combating crime and that it creates a "higher standard" to be met when an accused relies on the protection afforded by section 49. arrestor subjectively believed that the suspect posed a "future danger". The interpretation and application of the text of the 1998 amendment also raised concern in so far as the appropriate training of police officers is concerned specifically. Some are even of the opinion that it creates a "right to flee" and that it protect the rights of perpetrators to the detriment of law-abiding citizens. The wording of the Bill regarding the use of non-lethal force does not differ from the wording of the existing section 49. 37 Section 49 provides that when a suspect cannot be arrested without the use of force, the arrestor may, in order to effect the arrest, use such force as may be reasonably necessary and proportional in the circumstances to overcome the resistance or to prevent the suspect from fleeing.
But the proposed changes are aimed at the use of deadly force in effecting arrest.
The Bill inserts section 49(1)(c) which defines "deadly force" as force that is likely to cause serious bodily harm or death and includes, but is not limited to, shooting at a person with a firearm. Section 49 (2) is significantly amended by the Bill to provide:
If any arrestor attempts to arrest a suspect and the suspect resists the attempt, or flees, or resists the attempt and flees, when it is clear that an attempt to arrest him or her is being made, and the suspect cannot be arrested without the use of force, the arrestor may, in order to effect the arrest, use such force as may be reasonably necessary and proportional in the circumstances to overcome the resistance or to prevent the suspect from fleeing: Provided that the arrestor may use deadly force only if: (a) the suspect offers a threat of serious violence to the arrestor or another person; or (b) the arrestor suspects on reasonable grounds that the suspect has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily harm and there are no other reasonable means of carrying out the arrest, whether at that time or later.
The "future danger principle" which formed part of section 49 after the 1998 amendment has not been expressly included in the Bill. The "threat of danger" requirement which was set by the court in Walters 38 has, however, been included in the Bill. The Bill closely aligns the wording of section 49 (2) (ii) has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily harm.
The judgement in Walters 43 allowed for potentially deadly force to be used in order to arrest a fleeing suspect when the suspect committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily harm irrespective of whether or not the suspect posed an immediate threat of serious bodily harm to others at the stage of arrest.
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Cognisance was clearly given to the right of the State to ensure that dangerous criminals are brought to trial. shows a marked increase in deaths due to police action. 556 people were shot dead by the SAPS, which is reported to be the highest number in 12 years. However, the ICD in its Media Release on 25 March 2010 (http://www.icd.gov.za/media_statements/25032010.asp) stated clearly that such a link is not supported by facts and that the increase in deaths due to police action is more attributable to the increase of violent crimes itself. The ICD explains it as follows: "Some of the shootings by the police take place during confrontations with heavily armed suspects who will not hesitate to shoot at the police. Such shootings are in fact justified in law". The Bill, 47 as against the court in Walters, 48 does not include the requirement that the suspect must offer an "immediate" threat of serious bodily harm to the arrestor or members of the public in general. This implies that deadly force may be used when the arrestor reasonably believes the suspect offers a serious threat of danger to him or others at any time, and not only during the time of arrest. Therefore one can assume that the "future danger principle" is still provided for.
A major fear of the SAPS (and the main basis of its objections to the 1998 amendment) was that the 1998 amendment limits the police to being able to shoot a suspect only in self-defence. In Walters the court stated emphatically that the limitations placed on section 49 49 by the judgement had no bearing on the situation where the suspect threatened the life or safety of the prospective arrestor or of someone else. The right 50 and duty of police officers to protect their own lives and personal safety and also the lives and safety of others were endorsed and in no respect diminished. The only aspect decided in Walters was the right to use force, including deadly force, to stop a fleeing suspect from getting away.
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One can safely assume that the courts in future will interpret the provisions of the Bill in a similar fashion. Section 49 has nothing to do with the common law right to selfdefence. 52 The purpose of the use of force provided for by section 49 is to arrest a (fleeing) suspect. It is widely understood that to rely on a defence of self-defence, several requirements regarding the attack and defence action must be met. In relation to an attack there must be evidence of an attack; the attack must be unlawful; the attack must be directed at an interest which legally deserves protection;
and the attack must be imminent but not yet completed. In relation to a defence the defence action must be directed against the attacker; the defensive act must be The Bill provides for the use of force (including deadly force) in order to arrest a suspect and not only as a defence mechanism. The only requirements to be met are that the suspect must offer a serious threat of danger to the arrestor or others, or must have committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily harm and there is no other way (without using force) to arrest the suspect.
The Bill clearly allows for deadly force even in circumstances where the arrestor's life or bodily integrity is not at stake. The provisions of the Bill therefore negate the police's main objection to and fear of the 1998 amendment.
The Bill also complies with the proportionality requirement set out by the Constitutional Court in Walters, as it requires in section 49(2) that the force used must be reasonably necessary and proportional in the circumstances. It goes without saying that when a court must consider if a killing was justified in terms of section 49(2), the court must take into consideration all of the guidelines set out in Walters.
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Application of the Bill in practice
The law regarding the use of force when effecting an arrest requires that police officers on the ground must often make several very difficult, split-second decisions and judgement calls in less than ideal and often dangerous circumstances. The requirements set by the Bill are less stringent than the requirements of the current To make a decision in this regard the arrestor must take a number of factors into consideration e.g. the type of force to be used; the extent of the force to be used; whether such force is proportional to the seriousness of the crime the suspect allegedly committed; and whether such force is also proportional to the extent of the suspect's resistance against the arrest.
In addition, if the arrestor decides that the force "reasonably necessary and
proportional" in the circumstances is "deadly force" the arrestor must then also is the arrest of a suspect in order to bring the suspect to justice before a court of law, and a dead suspect can hardly be brought to court.
It is trite law that a suspect has various fundamental rights afforded to him by the Constitution 71 and any provision of law providing for the use of force (however reasonable that force may be) will always infringe on these rights. The question to be determined by the court is whether or not such an infringement constitutes an unjustifiable limitation 72 on the rights of the individual. A balance must always be struck between the conflicting rights of the suspect, the arrestor and society as a whole. All the rights and duties of the individual, the State and society at large must be weighed against one another while taking into account all the circumstances of the specific case, and the constitutional values.
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With regard to the use of force when effecting an arrest it must also be kept in mind that in terms of section 205(3) of the Constitution, it is the duty of the police inter alia to protect the safety and security of the citizens of South Africa and to maintain law and order.
The Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed in Govender 74 that it is the duty of the State (through the police) to protect the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. The court made it clear that a failure in this regard will not only cause liability on the part of the State but it will end in lawlessness and even a loss of the legitimacy of the and necessary force to arrest such a criminal, or to feel uncertain as to whether they should do so or not. If the police fail to arrest suspects when they are supposed to, they will be held accountable for their inaction too, and worse, they may lose credibility and even legitimacy in the eyes of the society they serve and must strive to protect. 76 It should be borne in mind that the right to life 77 is one of the two most important human rights inscribed in the Constitution. According to the Constitutional Court:
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The rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human rights, and the source of all other personal rights in chapter 3. By committing ourselves to a society founded on the recognition of human rights we are required to value these to rights above all others.
The wording of the Bill has already passed constitutional muster in a sense, as it basically duplicates the words used by the Constitutional Court in Walters, 79 where the Court set out the circumstances under which force may be used in effecting arrest. The application of this law in practice is, however, neither simple nor straightforward. It requires the balancing of conflicting rights as well as the making of several value judgements regarding what will be reasonable, necessary and proportional in each individual case. There is no mathematical formula to be used as a solution. Due to this complexity it is imperative that principles and procedures are implemented on ground level to simplify matters as much as possible for those who must apply the law -the legal principles and procedures are supposed to give "teeth" to the law in practice.
Providing the Bill with "teeth"
The drafting of the Bill is a step in the right direction. As explained above, the . Roughly a third of these cases were contact crimes. 34.1 people per 100 000 of the population were murdered and 347.3 people per 100 000 were robbed (robbery with aggravating circumstances as well as common robbery). 18 786 people per 100 000 of the population were robbed in their residential premises while 14 534 per 100 000 of the population were robbed in their places of business. Carjacking statistics indicate that 13 902 people per 100 000 of the population were carjacked. See the official crime statistics on SAPS 2009/2010 www.saps.gov.za. The police should know when to use force that is reasonable, necessary and proportional in particular circumstances and when to refrain from using force. They should also be made aware that the basic human rights and freedoms of individuals should not be unduly infringed in the exercise of their powers. The NYPD uses a "Use of Force Model Law" to train police officers extensively in the use of force during crime prevention and when effecting arrest. The ICD inter alia proposed in their report that the SAPS should for example be trained in the use of weapons other than fire-arms. According to the Basic Principles, law enforcement officials should not use firearms against persons except in self-defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives. In any event, intentional lethal use of firearms should be made only when strictly unavoidable, in order to protect life. The Basic Principles further provide that a warning of the intent to use a fire-arm must be given, it lays down several rules and regulations regarding the use of firearms, it requires the training of law enforcement officials, and it describes the reporting and review procedures to be followed. The use of force in effecting arrest must always be exercised within the parameters set by the law, which is why it is imperative that the law regarding the use of force in effecting arrest is clear, simple and certain. Arbitrary and wanton arrestors' discretion should never be tolerated. The establishment of objective standards to guide, regularise and make rationally reviewable the process for using force in effecting arrest, especially for using deadly force, is crucial.
Although the 201 Criminal Procedure Amendment Bill complies at face value with the requirements of the South African Constitution and international standards with regard to the use of force in effecting arrest, concerns can be raised over certain aspects.
Firstly it must be determined what exactly is meant by the words in section 49(2)(a):
"the suspect offers a threat of serious violence to the arrestor or another person".
What is the meaning of the word "offers" in this context? Should the word not be replaced with "poses"? Also what must be understood by the term "a threat"? Is it a "warning" or a "menace", or a "risk" or a "danger"? Must the threat be real -or is a threat of future violence also regarded as a threat? More importantly the caveat in section 49(2)(b) -that deadly force may be used only if there are no other reasonable means of carrying out the arrest -should also apply to section 49(2)(a).
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Despite these few concerns the 2010 Bill remains a step in the direction of clarifying and simplifying the South African law with regard to the use of force in effecting arrest. Still, it is only the first of a number of necessary steps.
A further step in the right direction would have been taken if the SAPS were to develop and implement a national "arrest law"-manual that explains in detail the law regarding the use of force in practice in simple terms. Such a manual should subsequently be explained to all members and understood by them, and should lead to the provision of the necessary training and the use of new technology, as explained above. 98 The SAPS has much material to draw from if one considers the Lastly, more comparative research on the case law of foreign jurisdictions relevant to police shootings should be conducted in order to ensure that South African law regarding the use of force in effecting arrest is ultimately the best possible. This contribution has not yet ventured in a study of this nature.
In a country like South Africa, with its very high levels of crime, 103 it is logical that more arrests are being executed than in countries with lower crime rates. 
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